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Abstract
We study robust mechanisms to sell a common-value good. We assume that the
mechanism designer knows the prior distribution of the buyers’ common value but is
unsure of the buyers’ information structure about the common value. We use linear
programming duality to derive mechanisms that guarantee a good revenue among all
information structures and all equilibria. Our mechanism maximizes the revenue guar-
antee when there is one buyer. As the number of buyers tends to infinity, the revenue
guarantee of our mechanism converges to the full surplus.
∗I thank Gabriel Carroll, Vitor Farinha Luz, Ben Golub, Wei Li, and Michael Ostrovsky for comments
and discussions. Email: songzid@sfu.ca
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study robust mechanism design for selling a common-value good. A robust
mechanism is one that works well under a variety of circumstances, in particular under weak
assumptions about participants’ information structure. The goal of robust mechanism design
is to reduce the “base of common knowledge required to conduct useful analyses of practical
problems,” as envisioned by Wilson (1987).
The literature on robust mechanism design has so far largely focused on private value
settings.1 Common value is of course important in many real-life markets (particularly
financial markets) and has a long tradition in auction theory. Robustness with respect to
information structure is especially relevant with common value, since there is no canonical
information structure in this setting. In practice it is hard to pinpoint exactly what is a
signal (or a set of signals) for a buyer and to quantify the correlation between the signal and
the common value, not to mention specifying the joint distribution of signals for all buyers
that correctly captures their beliefs and higher order beliefs about the common value.
We suppose that the prior distribution of the common value is known. We want to design
a mechanism that guarantees a good revenue for every information structure consistent with
the prior and every equilibrium from the information structure. Such mechanism is clearly
useful when the designer does not know the nature of information held by the strategic buyers.
Moreover, such mechanism can be adopted as the default trading protocol that works well
in a variety of circumstances with minimal customization. We are inspired by a recent paper
of Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2016) which works out the revenue guarantee of the first
price auction (among other results).
We come up with a mechanism that guarantees a better revenue than the first price
auction. The mechanism is simple to implement in practice and can be described as follows.
Suppose there is one common-value good to sell, and I ≥ 1 buyers with quasi-linear utility.
Let the message space for each buyer i be the interval [0, 1]. We think of a message zi ∈ [0, 1]
as the demand of buyer i. Buyer i gets the good with probability qi(zi, z−i) (qi could also
be buyer i’s quantity of allocation if the good is divisible) and pays Pi(zi, z−i). If z1 ≥ z2 ≥
1See Chung and Ely (2007), Brooks (2013), Frankel (2014), Carroll (2015, 2016), Yamashita (2015, 2016),
Carrasco, Farinha Luz, Monteiro, and Moreira (2015), Chen and Li (2016), Hartline and Roughgarden (2016),
among others; we follow this literature by adopting a max-min approach for robust mechanisms.
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· · · ≥ zI , then
qi(zi, z−i) =
I−1∑
j=i
zj − zj+1
j
+
zI
I
, Pi(zi, z−i) = X(exp(zi/A)− 1), (1)
and analogously for any other ordering of (z1, z2, . . . , zI). That is, the lowest buyer gets 1/I
of his demand, the second lowest buyers gets that plus 1/(I−1) of the difference between his
and the lowest demand, and so on. Thus, the total probability/quantity of allocation is equal
to the highest demand. Moreover, each buyer’s payment depends only on his demand and
is independent of his final allocation, like an all-pay auction. Finally, A > 0 and X > 0 in
Equation (1) are constants that are optimized for the prior distribution of value; intuitively,
the constant A scales the demand, while the constant X scales the payment. We call the
mechanism in Equation (1) the exponential price mechanism.
We prove that the exponential price mechanism gives the optimal revenue guarantee
when there is one buyer (I = 1). In this case we know sharp upper bound on the revenue
guarantee. For example, if the prior is the uniform distribution on [0, 1], then the designer
can guarantee (among all information structures and all equilibria) a revenue of at most
1/4: fix any mechanism, there is the private-value information structure, and its equilibrium
revenue must be less than 1/4 which is obtained by the private-value optimal mechanism (a
posted price of 1/2). Roesler and Szentes (2016) study the optimal information structure
for a buyer when the seller is best responding to this information structure. Roesler and
Szentes’s optimal information structure gives a subtle upper bound on the seller’s revenue
guarantee. For example, when the prior is the uniform distribution on [0, 1], the seller can
guarantee a revenue of at most 0.2036. We prove that the exponential price mechanism
exactly guarantees the Roesler-Szentes upper bound for any prior distribution when I = 1.2
In contrast, any posted price does not give the optimal revenue guarantee; for example, when
the prior is the uniform [0, 1] distribution, the optimal posted price guarantees a revenue of
only 1/8.3
2In other words, Roesler and Szentes (2016) characterize for one buyer:
min
info. structure
max
mechanism, equilibrium
Revenue,
while we characterize:
max
mechanism
min
info. structure, equilibrium
Revenue,
and show it is equal to their min-max value. Equilibrium here is a mapping from signals of the information
structure to messages in the mechanism, such that there is no incentive to deviate.
3When the prior is the uniform [0, 1] distribution, a posted price of p ≤ 1/2 guarantees a revenue of
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As the number I of buyers increases, the exponential price mechanism guarantees a
better revenue, as we numerically demonstrate in Figure 1 and Figure 2. We prove that
as the number of buyers tends to infinity, the revenue guarantee of the exponential price
mechanism (over all information structures and all equilibria) becomes arbitrarily close to the
full surplus (the expectation of the common value). Since the full surplus is an upper bound
on the equilibrium revenue of every mechanism, the exponential price mechanism achieves
the optimal revenue guarantee as I → ∞. This guarantee of full surplus extraction in the
limit is not obtained by the first price auction (as shown by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom,
and Weber (1983) and Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2016)), second price auction4, all-
pay auction5, or with a posted price (consider the case when all I buyers have symmetric
information about the common value). And unlike the mechanisms of Cre´mer and McLean
(1985, 1988), our mechanism is detail free and depends only on the support of the prior
distribution, and extracts the full surplus for all information structures in the limit.
To study the revenue guarantee of mechanisms we introduce a duality approach which
could be useful for other problems. We want to minimize the expected revenue over the
set of information structures and equilibria for a given mechanism, and then maximize the
minimized revenue over the set of mechanisms. Bergemann and Morris (2016) give the
powerful insight that we can combine information structure and equilibrium into a single
entity called Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, which is a joint distribution over actions and
value subject to obedience and consistency constraints. Minimizing revenue over Bayes
correlated equilibria for any fixed mechanism is a linear programming problem, and we
can equivalently solve the dual problem which is a maximization problem over the dual
variables of constraints associated with Bayes correlated equilibrium. These dual variables
have the interpretation as transition rates for a continuous-time Markov process over the
message space, similar to the transition probabilities in Myerson (1997) as dual variables for
complete-information correlated equilibrium. Moreover, we can combine the maximization
over the dual variables with the maximization over the mechanism design variables, so we
have a single maximization problem which is equivalent to but more tractable than the
(1 − 2p)p: suppose the buyer’s information about his value is the partition {[0, 2p), [2p, 1]}, an equilibrium
is to buy at price p if and only if [2p, 1] is realized.
4For a second price auction with a reserve price (potentially zero), suppose there is one informed buyer
who knows the common value v, and I−1 uninformed buyers who only knows the prior. The following is an
equilibrium: the informed buyer truthfully bids v, and all uninformed buyers bid 0. Clearly, this equilibrium
does not obtain the full surplus in revenue as I →∞.
5The minimum-revenue information structure in Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2016) for the first price
auction also fails to extract the full surplus in revenue for an all-pay auction as I →∞.
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original max-min problem.
2 Model
Information
The mechanism designer has a single good to sell. Let I = {1, 2, . . . , I} be a finite set of
buyers, I ≥ 1. The buyers have a common value v ∈ V = {0, ν, 2ν, . . . , 1} for the good and
have quasi-linear utility, where ν > 0 is a constant. Let p ∈ ∆(V ) be the prior distribution of
common value; the prior p is known by the designer as well as by the buyers. (The designer
only knows the prior p about the value.)
Each buyer i may possess some additional information si ∈ Si about the common value
beyond the prior, where Si is a finite set of signals. We have p˜ ∈ ∆(V ×
∏
i∈I Si) such that
margV p˜ = p,
6 so buyer i’s information about the common value is informed by p˜( · | si).
As discussed in the introduction, the information structure (Si, p˜)i∈I is not known by the
designer.
Mechanism
A mechanism is a set of allocation rules qi : M → [0, 1] and payment rules Pi : M → R
satisfying
∑
i∈I qi(m) ≤ 1, where Mi is the message space of buyer i and is a finite set,
and M =
∏
i∈IMi the space of message profiles. A mechanism defines a game in which the
buyers simultaneously submit messages and have utility
Ui(v,m) = v · qi(m)− Pi(m). (2)
The allocation qi(m) can be interpreted as the probability of getting the good in the case of
an indivisible good, and as the share of the good in the case of a divisible good.
We assume that a mechanism always has an opt-out option for each buyer i: there exists
a message mi ≡ 0 ∈Mi such that qi(0,m−i) = Pi(0,m−i) = 0 for every m−i ∈M−i.
In this paper we focus on symmetric mechanism, which satisfies
qi(m
′
i,m
′
−i) = q1(m1 = m
′
i,m−1 = m
′
−i) ≡ q(m′i,m′−i) (3)
Pi(m
′
i,m
′
−i) = P1(m1 = m
′
i,m−1 = m
′
−i) ≡ P (m′i,m′−i)
6Let margV p˜ be the marginal distribution of p˜ over V .
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for every i ∈ I and m′ ∈ M . By m−1 = m′−i we mean that m−1 and m′−i have the
same elements but not necessarily the same ordering of elements; for example we may have
m−1 = (a, b, c) and m′−i = (c, b, a). Intuitively, in a symmetric mechanism every buyer is
treated in the same way. For a symmetric mechanism we abbreviate q1(m) to q(m) and
P1(m) to P (m).
Equilibrium
Given a mechanism (qi, Pi)i∈I and an information structure (Si, p˜)i∈I , we have a game of
incomplete information. A Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game is defined by strategy
σi : Si → ∆(Mi) for each buyer i such that for every si ∈ Si, the support of σi(si) is among
the best responses to others’ strategies:
suppσi(si) ⊆ argmax
mi∈Mi
∑
(v,s−i)∈V×S−i
Ui(v, (mi, σ−i(s−i)))p˜(v, s−i | si), (4)
where Ui(v, (mi, σ−i(s−i))) is linearly extended from Equation (2).
The ex ante distribution µ ∈ ∆(V ×M) generated by any BNE (σi)i∈I of any information
structure (Si, p˜)i∈I satisfies the following two conditions:∑
m∈M
µ(v,m) = p(v), v ∈ V, (Consistency)∑
(v,m−i)∈V×M−i
µ(v,m) (Ui(v, (mi,m−i))− Ui(v, (m′i,m−i))) ≥ 0, i ∈ I, (mi,m′i) ∈Mi ×Mi.
(Obedience)
A distribution µ ∈ ∆(V ×M) that satisfies the above two conditions is called a Bayes
Correlated Equilibrium (BCE) of the mechanism (qi, Pi)i∈I . For any BCE µ, there exists
an information structure and a BNE of that information structure that generates µ. See
Bergemann and Morris (2016) for more details.
For notational brevity, we sometimes omit the set to which a summation variable belongs
when it is obvious; for example, summing over m means summing over m ∈M .
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Designer’s problem
The mechanism designer wants to solve:
sup
(qi,Pi)i∈I
min
µ∈∆(V×M)
∑
(v,m)
∑
i
µ(v,m)Pi(m) (5)
such that µ is a BCE of (qi, Pi)i∈I .
Definition 1. A mechanism guarantees a revenue R if every BCE of this mechanism has an
expected revenue larger than or equal to R.
3 Main Results
Our main results are a class of mechanisms that give good revenue guarantee. Consider a
symmetric mechanism with k messages besides the opt-out message: Mi = {0, 1, . . . , k}, for
every buyer i ∈ I. The allocation q(m1,m−1) is given by:
q(0,m−1) = 0, m−1 ∈M−1, (6)
q(m1 + 1,m−1)− q(m1,m−1) =
 1
| rank(m1,m−1)|
∑
j∈rank(m1,m−1)
1
j
 · 1
k
, 0 ≤ m1 ≤ k − 1,
where rank(m1,m−1) ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , I} is the set of ranks (from the top) ofm1 in (m1,m2, . . . ,mI);
for example, rank(20, 10, 20, 40, 30) = {3, 4}, because m1 = 20 and m3 = 20 are tied for the
third and the fourth place in this list; and rank(20, 10, 30, 40, 30) = {4} because in this list
m1 = 20 is unambiguously ranked fourth, even though there is a tie for the second and the
third rank. We think of a message mi as the demand of a fraction mi/k of the good; the
allocation in Equation (6) is increasing with the demand at a rate equal to the reciprocal of
the demand’s rank: a rate of 1 for the highest demand, of 1/2 for the second highest demand,
of 1/3 for the third highest demand, and so on. Moreover, we break tie in a symmetric way
and randomize over all feasible ranks, in the case when | rank(m1,m−1)| > 1. It is easy to
check that Equation (6) uniquely defines an allocation function (i.e., the feasibility condition
is always satisfied); the total amount of allocation is at most max(m1,m2, . . . ,mI)/k.
The payment of our mechanism is:
P (m1,m−1) = X
((
1 +
1
a
)m1
− 1
)
, (7)
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where X > 0 and a > 0 are constants that are optimized for a given prior distribution p.
That is, the payment of every buyer depends only on his message and is independent of his
final allocation.
As k → ∞ and a = A · k, the mechanism from Equations (6) and (7) converges to
(1), where we reparametrize mi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} to zi ≡ mi/k ∈ [0, 1], where zi is buyer i’s
demand. Thus, we abuse the terminology and refer to the mechanism from Equations (6)
and (7) as the exponential price mechanism as well.
Intuitively, the exponential price mechanism tries to be egalitarian and allocate some
quantity of the good to every buyer. Since the exponential payment is a convex function of
quantity, it makes sense to split the good among all buyers. Of course, a buyer with a higher
demand gets more quantity because such buyer is paying more. If z1 > z2 > · · · > zI , then
buyer i gets exactly (zi− zi+1)/i more than the allocation of buyer i+ 1; we have the factor
1/i because the quantity (zi−zi+1)/i is also acquired by all buyer j > i+1, and by definition
there are i of them. The intuition for the exponential functional form of the payment rule is
best illustrated when there is a single buyer and is presented in Section 4.2.1.
When there is a single buyer (I = 1), the exponential price mechanism becomes:
q(m1) = m1/k, P (m1) = X
((
1 +
1
a
)m1
− 1
)
, m1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, (8)
since rank(m1) = {1} by definition. In fact, this mechanism achieves the optimal revenue
guarantee:
Theorem 1. Suppose there is one buyer, and as ν → 0 the prior p converges to a distribution
with a positive density. There exist constants A > 0 and X > 0 such that the exponential
price mechanism with a = A · k and the given X achieves the optimal revenue guarantee
(i.e., solution to Problem (5)) as k →∞ and ν → 0.
That is, for any  > 0, there exists ν¯ and k¯ such that for any ν ≤ ν¯ and k ≥ k¯, the
exponential price mechanism with a = A · k and the given X guarantees a revenue within 
of the best possible from Problem (5).
We compute the optimal revenue guarantee of Theorem 1 for various prior distributions
in Figure 2 (page 24).
Our second result states the exponential price mechanism guarantees in expected revenue
the full surplus (the expected common value) as the number of buyers tends to infinity. In
this sense the mechanism is asymptotically optimal.
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Theorem 2. Let a = k
log(I)
and X = 1
2I log(I)
. The exponential price mechanism guarantees
a revenue of
∑
v v · p(v) as k →∞ and I →∞.
That is, for any  > 0, there exists I¯ and k¯ such that for any I ≥ I¯ and k ≥ k¯, the
exponential price mechanism with a = k
log(I)
and X = 1
2I log(I)
guarantees a revenue within 
of
∑
v v · p(v).
The values of a and X in Theorem 2 depend only on the support of the prior (which is
in [0, 1]) and is independent of the other details of the prior. Thus, the convergence of the
mechanism’s revenue guarantee to the full surplus holds for every prior supported on [0, 1].
We illustrate the revenue guarantee of the exponential price mechanism as a function
of the number of buyers in Figure 1; we also compare with the first price auction with the
reserve price chosen to maximize the revenue guarantee (Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris,
2016). For this figure we take the prior to be the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and ν → 0.
We see that the revenue guarantee of the exponential price mechanism is fairly close to the
full surplus of 0.5 when there are 20 buyers.
5 10 15 20 # of buyers
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Revenue guarantee
Exp. price mech.
First price auction(BBM, 2016)
Figure 1: Revenue guarantees of the exponential price mechanism and of the first price
auction with the optimal reserve price.
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4 Duality Approach to Robust Mechanism
To prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we introduce a duality approach. For a given mechanism
(qi, Pi)i∈I , the BCE that minimizes the expected revenue is found by the following problem:
min
µ
∑
(v,m)
∑
i
Pi(m)µ(v,m) (9)
subject to:∑
(v,m−i)
(Ui(v,m)− Ui(v, (m′i,m−i)))µ(v,m) ≥ 0, i ∈ I, (mi,m′i) ∈Mi ×Mi,∑
m
µ(v,m) = p(v), v ∈ V,
µ(v,m) ≥ 0, v ∈ V,m ∈M,
where Ui is the utility function defined by Equation (2).
The dual problem to Problem (9) is:
max
(αi,γ)i∈I
∑
v
p(v)γ(v) (10)
subject to:
γ(v) +
∑
i
∑
m′i
[Ui(v,m)− Ui(v, (m′i,m−i))]αi(m′i | mi) ≤
∑
i
Pi(m), v ∈ V,m ∈M,
αi(m
′
i | mi) ≥ 0, i ∈ I, (mi,m′i) ∈Mi ×Mi,
where αi(m
′
i | mi) is the dual variable for the obedience constraint of not playing m′i when
“recommended” to play mi in (9), and γ(v) is the dual variable for the consistency constraint
of
∑
m µ(v,m) = p(v). By the linear programming duality theorem, Problems (9) and
(10) have the same optimal value; their solutions are characterized by the complementary
slackness conditions.
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Mechanism designer’s problem in (5) can be written as:
sup
(Pi,qi,αi,γ)i∈I
∑
v
p(v)γ(v) (11)
subject to:
γ(v) ≤
∑
i
Pi(m) +
∑
i
∑
m′i
[v(qi(m
′
i,m−i)− qi(m))− Pi(m′i,m−i) + Pi(m)]αi(m′i | mi), v ∈ V,m ∈M,
qi(m) ≥ 0,
∑
i′
qi′(m) ≤ 1, qi(0,m−i) = Pi(0,m−i) = 0, i ∈ I,m ∈M
αi(m
′
i | mi) ≥ 0, (mi,m′i) ∈Mi ×Mi, i ∈ I,
where we label the opt-out message as 0 ∈Mi.
The advantage of problem (11) over the equivalent problem (5) is that we work with
a maximization problem instead of a max-min problem. Moreover, we work with (αi)i∈I ,
where each αi has |Mi ×Mi| dimensions, instead of µ which has |V ×
∏
i∈IMi| dimensions;
the reduction in dimensions is significant if |V | is large. Lastly, if we find a tuple (αi, qi, Pi)i∈I
that satisfies the constraints of Problem (11), then the value of (11) under such (αi, qi, Pi)i∈I
is by definition a lower bound on the optimal revenue guarantee. On the other hand, finding
a feasible tuple (µ, qi, Pi)i∈I for Problem (5) (i.e., µ is a BCE of (qi, Pi)i∈I) does not yield by
itself any conclusion about the revenue guarantee, since there may exist another BCE µ′ of
(qi, Pi)i∈I with a lower revenue than µ.
Problem (11) can be summarized as:
max
(qi,Pi,αi)i∈I
∑
v
p(v) ·min
m
Rev(v,m), (12)
subject to the feasibility constraints, where
Rev(v,m) ≡
∑
i
Pi(m) +∑
m′i
(Ui(v,m
′
i,m−i)− Ui(v,m))αi(m′i | mi)
 . (13)
We call Rev(v,m) the virtual revenue. Since Ui(v,m) is a linear function of v, so is Rev(v,m)
for any fixed m. We interpret αi(m
′
i | mi) as buyer i’s rate of deviation from message mi
to m′i, and Rev(v,m) as the revenue generated by the message profile m, plus the incentive
to deviate from m given value v and rates of deviation (αi)i∈I . By minimizing Rev(v,m)
over m, we are ignoring message profile m that either (1) has a large revenue, or (2) there
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is a large incentive to deviate from m by a buyer. Intuitively, (1) and (2) combines to give
equilibrium message profile with minimum revenue.
Problem (11) is bounded above by
∑
v v · p(v), by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For every v ∈ V , we have:
min
m
Rev(v,m) ≤ v. (14)
Proof. Fix an arbitrary v ∈ V . Consider the problem:
max
γ,(αi)i∈I
γ (15)
subject to:
γ +
∑
i
∑
m′i
(Ui(v,m)− Ui(v, (m′i,m−i)))αi(m′i | mi) ≤
∑
i
Pi(m), m ∈M,
αi(m
′
i | mi) ≥ 0, i ∈ I, (mi,m′i) ∈Mi ×Mi.
The dual to the above problem is:
min
µ
∑
m
µ(m)
∑
i
Pi(m) (16)
subject to:∑
m−i
µ(m)(Ui(v,m)− Ui(v, (m′i,m−i))) ≥ 0, i ∈ I, (mi,m′i) ∈Mi ×Mi,∑
m
µ(m) = 1,
µ(m) ≥ 0, m ∈M,
which is minimizing the revenue over complete-information correlated equilibria µ (for the
fixed v). For any µ satisfying the constraints, we have
∑
m−i µ(m)Ui(v,m) =
∑
m−i µ(m)(vqi(m)−
Pi(m)) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ I and mi ∈ Mi because of the presence of the opt-out mes-
sage 0 ∈ Mi. Therefore,
∑
m µ(m)
∑
i(vqi(m) − Pi(m)) ≥ 0, and
∑
m µ(m)
∑
i Pi(m) ≤∑
m µ(m)
∑
i vqi(m) ≤ v. Thus the optimal solution of (15) is bounded above by v.
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4.1 A Lower Bound
We work with symmetric mechanism q(m) ≡ q1(m) and P (m) ≡ P1(m) (cf. Equation (3))
and symmetric α(m′i | mi) ≡ αi(m′i | mi).
Instead of directly solving Problem (12), we make some educated guess on (qi, Pi, αi) to
get a lower bound on the maximum value of Problem (12). Suppose Mi = {0, 1, . . . , k} for
every buyer i ∈ I, where q(0,m−1) = 0 = P (0,m−1) for every m−1 ∈M−1.
We focus on
α(j′ | j) =
a j′ = j + 10 j′ 6= j + 1 , (j, j′) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}2. (17)
Condition (17) says that the local obedience constraint in BCE is binding: if the above α
satisfies the complementarity slackness condition with a BCE µ, then a buyer is indifferent
between messages j and j + 1 if he is “recommended” to submit j in the BCE µ. This is a
discrete analogue of the first order condition at j.
Condition (17) implies that there are two kinds of messages: the “interior” message
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, and the “boundary” message j = k. Thus there are I + 1 kinds of
message profiles m ∈ M = {0, 1, . . . , k}I , depending on the number of boundary messages
in m. For 0 ≤ n ≤ I, define the class of message profiles:
M(n) = {m ∈M : |{i ∈ I : mi = k}| = n}. (18)
The sets M(n), 0 ≤ n ≤ I, form a partition of M . Our second assumption is that
Rev(v,m) = Rev(v,m′) ∀v ∈ V, if m and m′ belong to the same M(n). (19)
Condition (19) attemps to make Rev(v,m) over m as redundant as possible, to minimize
the number of items inside the min operator in Equation (12).
We now go to the exponential price mechanism defined by Equations (6) and (7). Clearly,
if there are n boundary messages in a message profile m, then the rest (the interior messages)
have ranks among {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , I}, and by Equation (6) we have:
∑
i:mi<k
q(mi + 1,m−i)− q(mi,m−i) = 1
k
I∑
j=n+1
1
j
. (20)
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Moreover, for an interior mi we have:
P (mi,m−i)− a(P (mi + 1,m−i)− P (mi,m−i)) = −X (21)
by Equation (7).7 Therefore, under Condition (17) we have:
Rev(v,m) =
a v
k
I∑
j=n+1
1
j
+ nX((1 + 1/a)k − 1)− (I − n)X, if m ∈M(n). (22)
Thus, Condition (19) is satisfied, and we have the following lower bound on the maximum
value of Problem (12):
Π∗I ≡ sup
k≥1, a≥0, X
(∑
v
p(v) · min
0≤n≤I
(
a v
k
I∑
j=n+1
1
j
+ nX((1 + 1/a)k − 1)− (I − n)X
))
. (23)
Proposition 1. The exponential price mechanism guarantees a revenue of Π∗I defined in
(23).
Proof. The proof is given by the construction above.
We prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 by studying Π∗1 and limI→∞Π
∗
I . In Figure 1 (page
9) we plot Π∗I for the uniform [0, 1] distribution, as ν → 0.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Let I = 1. Suppose as ν → 0, the prior p converges to a distribution with density ρ, where
ρ : [0, 1]→ [0,∞) is positive almost everywhere.
To prove Theorem 1, we need to discuss a revelant result in Roesler and Szentes (2016).
Roesler and Szentes (2016) study the optimal information structure for the buyer (and
the worst for the seller) when the seller best responds to the information structure. Such
7 In fact, Equation (7) is the solution to the difference equation
P (mi,m−i)− a(P (mi + 1,m−i)− P (mi,m−i)) = −X
for mi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, with the initial condition of P (0,m−i) = 0.
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information structure has the following cumulative distribution function for the signals:
GBpi (s) =

1 s ≥ B
1− pi/s s ∈ [pi,B)
0 s < pi
, (24)
where s ∈ [0, 1] is an unbiased signal of the buyer for his value (E[v | s] = s), 0 < pi ≤ B
are two free parameters, and there is an atom of size pi/B at s = B. If the buyer has this
distribution of unbiased signals and observes the realization of the signal, then the seller
is clearly indifferent between every posted price in [pi,B] and has a revenue of pi from the
optimal mechanism (which is a posted price).8 Thus, pi is an upper bound on the seller’s
revenue guarantee.
Given the density ρ(v), GBpi (s) is a distribution of an unbiased signal on v if and only if
ρ is a mean-preserving spread of GBpi (s), which holds if and only if:∫ 1
0
v ρ(v) dv =
∫ 1
0
s dGBpi (s) = pi + pi logB − pi log pi (25)
min
s∈[pi,B]
F (s, pi) ≥ 0, where (26)
F (s, pi) ≡
∫ s
s′=0
∫ s′
v=0
ρ(v) dv ds′ −
∫ s
0
GBpi (s
′) ds′ =
∫ s
s′=0
∫ s′
v=0
ρ(v) dv ds′ − (s− pi − pi log s+ pi log pi),
i.e., GBpi has the same mean as ρ and second-order stochastically dominates ρ. Let B = B(pi)
be defined from pi by Equation (25).
Roesler and Szentes (2016) prove that the best information structure for the buyer (and
the worst for the seller) when the seller best responds to the information structure is GB
∗
pi∗ ,
where pi∗ is the smallest pi such that mins∈[pi,B(pi)] F (s, pi) ≥ 0, and B∗ ≡ B(pi∗); that is, pi∗
is the smallest pi such that ρ is a mean-preserving spread of G
B(pi)
pi (s). For our purpose, by
making pi small we tighten the upper bound on the seller’s revenue guarantee.
We now show that the exponential price mechanism can obtain the upper bound pi∗. In
the case of one buyer, Problem (23) simplifies to:
Π∗1 ≡ max
k≥1, a≥0, X
∑
v
min
(
a v
k
−X, X
((
1 +
1
a
)k
− 1
))
p(v), (27)
8Intuitively, if the seller has a strict incentive over the posted price, then we can slightly change the
buyer’s information structure to lower the seller’s optimal revenue and to increase the buyer’s surplus, while
preserving the seller’s best response in posted price.
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Set a = A · k. As ν → 0 and k →∞, we have
∑
v
min(av/k,X(1 + 1/a)k) p(v)−X −→ Π1 ≡
∫ 1
0
min(Av,X exp(1/A)) ρ(v)dv −X. (28)
We maximize Π over A and X. Suppose X exp(1/A)
A
∈ [0, 1], the first order condition is:
∂Π1
∂X
=
∫ 1
X exp(1/A)
A
exp(1/A) ρ(v) dv − 1 = 0, (29)
∂Π1
∂A
=
∫ X exp(1/A)
A
0
v ρ(v) dv −
∫ 1
X exp(1/A)
A
X exp(1/A)
A2
ρ(v) dv = 0.
If the above first order condition holds and X exp(1/A)
A
∈ [0, 1], then we have Π1 = X/A.
Going back to the construction of Roesler-Szentes, let s∗ be an arbitrary selection from
argmins∈[pi∗,B∗] F (s, pi
∗). Since mins∈[pi,B(pi)] F (s, pi) is a continuous function of pi, we have
F (s∗, pi∗) = 0. Moreover, s∗ must be interior9, so we have ∂F
∂s
(s∗, pi∗) = 0.
Therefore, we have (the first line is ∂F
∂s
(s∗, pi∗) = 0, and the second line is F (s∗, pi∗) = 0):
∫ s∗
v=0
ρ(v) dv − 1 + pi∗/s∗ = 0, (30)∫ s∗
s=0
∫ s
v=0
ρ(v) dv ds− (s∗ − pi∗ − pi∗ log s∗ + pi∗ log pi∗) = −
∫ s∗
0
v ρ(v) dv + pi∗ log s∗ − pi∗ log pi∗ = 0,
where in the second equality of the second line we use integration by parts and substitute
in the first line. Clearly, there exist unique A > 0 and X > 0 such that s∗ = X exp(1/A)/A
and pi∗ = X/A. (We have s∗ < B∗ < 1.) Then the above equations become:
∫ 1
X exp(1/A)
A
ρ(v) dv = exp(−1/A),
∫ X exp(1/A)
A
0
v ρ(v) dv − X
A2
= 0,
which is clearly equivalent to Equation (29).
Therefore, for any  > 0, when k is sufficiently large and ν sufficiently small, we have
Π∗1 ≥ pi∗− . When ν is sufficiently small, the revenue guarantee must be smaller than pi∗+ 
by the Roesler-Szentes construction. This concludes the proof.
9If B∗ < 1, we must have F (B∗, pi∗) > 0, for otherwise we would have
∫ 1
0
GB
∗
pi∗ (s) ds >
∫ 1
s=0
∫ s
v=0
ρ(v) dv ds,
which would contradict the fact that GB
∗
pi∗ has the same mean as p. If B
∗ = 1, then we have ∂F∂s (B
∗, pi∗) =
pi∗
B∗ > 0. In any case s
∗ 6= B∗. Since F (pi∗, pi∗) > 0, we also have s∗ 6= pi∗.
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4.2.1 Intuition on Theorem 1.
We note that as k → ∞ and a = A · k, the exponential price mechanism in Equation (8)
becomes:
q(z) = z, P (z) = X(exp(z/A)− 1), (31)
where z ≡ m1/k ∈ [0, 1] is the demand of the buyer.
Fix an unbiased information structure (S,G) for the buyer: E[v | s] = s for every
s ∈ S ⊆ [0, 1], and s ∈ S has the cumulative distribution function G(s).
Given a realization of signal s, the buyer solves:
max
z
s · z −X(exp(z/A)− 1).
If s ≤ pi∗ ≡ X/A, then the buyer’s optimal demand is z = 0, and he pays 0; if s ≥ s∗ ≡
X exp(1/A)/A, then the buyer’s optimal demand is z = 1, and he pays X(exp(1/A)− 1)). If
s ∈ [pi∗, s∗], then the optimal demand is given by the first order condition s = X exp(z/A)/A,
and the buyer pays X(exp(z/A)− 1)|s=X exp(z/A)/A = As−X. Thus, the equilibrium revenue
under the unbiased information structure (S,G) is:
Π1(G) ≡
∫ 1
s=pi∗
min(As−X,X(exp(1/A)− 1)) dG(s), (32)
which is similar to Π1 in Equation (28), but with a different lower limit in the integral.
In general, we have:
Π1(G) ≥
∫ 1
s=0
min(As−X,X(exp(1/A)−1)) dG(s) ≥
∫ 1
s=0
min(As−X,X(exp(1/A)−1)) ρ(s) ds = Π1,
(33)
since ρ is a mean-preserving spread of G, and min(As − X,X(exp(z/A) − 1)) is a concave
function of s; thus, Π1 is a lower bound on the equilibrium revenue over all information
structures, confirming Proposition 1 when I = 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that Π1 = Π1(G) when G = G
B∗
pi∗ as constructed by Roesler
and Szentes. This can be seen in Equation (33) as follows: the first inequality in (33) is
an equality when G = GB
∗
pi∗ because G
B∗
pi∗ is supported on the interval [pi
∗, B∗]; the second
inequality in (33) is an equality when G = GB
∗
pi∗ because
∫ s∗
s=pi∗ s dG
B∗
pi∗ (s) =
∫ s∗
v=0
v ρ(v) dv and
GB
∗
pi∗ (s
∗) =
∫ s∗
v=0
ρ(v) dv by Equation (30).
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4.3 Proof of Theorem 2
For each 0 ≤ n ≤ I, define
Revn(v) =
a v
k
I∑
j=n+1
1
j
+ nX((1 + 1/a)k − 1)− (I − n)X, (34)
which is Rev(v,m) for any m ∈M(n). Let
v(n) =
(n+ 1)kX
a
(1 + 1/a)k, (35)
By construction, we have Revn(v(n)) = Revn+1(v(n)) for each 0 ≤ n ≤ I−1. Set v(−1) = 0
and v(I) = ∞. Clearly, if X > 0, then Revn(v) = min0≤n′≤I Revn′(v) if and only if v ∈
[v(n− 1), v(n)].
We want to approximate the identity function v by min0≤n≤I Revn(v). To do so, we
set A = 1/ log(I), X = 1/(2I log(I)) and a = Ak. We have limk→∞(1 + 1/a)k = I,
limk→∞ v(1) = 1. Thus,
lim
k→∞
∑
v∈V
p(v) min
0≤n≤I
Revn(v) =
∑
v≤v(0),v∈V
p(v)
(
v
log(I)
I∑
j=1
1
j
− 1
2 log(I)
)
(36)
+
∑
v>v(0),v∈V
p(v)
(
v
log(I)
I∑
j=2
1
j
− 1
log(I)
)
Clearly, the above equation converges to
∑
v v · p(v) as I →∞. This completes the proof.
5 Generalization
Since they play a central role in the derivation of exponential price mechanism, we devote
this section to better understand Conditions (17) and (19). We first show that to maximize
the revenue guarantee it is without loss of generality to assume Condition (17). Given
Condition (17), we then fully characterize the implications of Condition (19), which give a
generalization of exponential price mechanism.
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5.1 Simplifying the Dual Variables
In this subsection we show that, as long as k is large, for the optimal revenue guarantee it
is without loss of generality to focus on symmetric mechanism with Mi = {0, 1, . . . , k} and
dual variables in Equation (17), for every i ∈ I.
Transition probability matrix
Fix an arbitrary tuple (qi, Pi, αi)i∈I . Recall that there exists an opt-out message 0 ∈Mi for
every buyer i. We define a new (q˜i, P˜i, α˜i)i∈I as follows:
(i) Define
a ≡ max
i∈I
max
mi∈Mi
∑
m′i 6=mi
αi(m
′
i | mi) + c, (37)
where c > 0 is an arbitrary constant, and
Ai(m′i | mi) ≡
αi(m′i | mi)/a m′i 6= mi1−∑m′′i 6=mi Ai(m′′i | mi) m′i = mi , (mi,m
′
i) ∈M2i (38)
If we interpret αi as the transition rates of a continuous-time Markov process over Mi,
then Ai is a transition probability matrix embedded in the process. Because of the
positive constant c, Ai(mi | mi) > 0 for every mi ∈ Mi, so every mi is aperiodic in Ai
(Stroock (2013), Section 3.1.3)
(ii) Define a new message space M˜i ≡ {0, 1, . . . , k} for every buyer i. Message 0 is still the
opt-out message. Message j ∈ M˜i is the “mixed-strategy” message given by (Ai)j( · |
0) ∈ ∆(Mi):
q˜i(j,m−i) ≡
∑
mi∈Mi
(Ai)j(mi | 0) qi(mi,m−i), m−i ∈M−i, (39)
P˜i(j,m−i) ≡
∑
mi∈Mi
(Ai)j(mi | 0)Pi(mi,m−i),
where (Ai)j is Ai raised to the j-th power (the j-step transition probability ma-
trix). Moreover, we extend q˜i(m˜i,m−i) and P˜i(m˜i,m−i) linearly to q˜i(m˜i, m˜−i) and
P˜i(m˜i, m˜−i) for each m˜−i ∈ M˜−i.
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(iii) Define
α˜i(m˜
′
i | m˜i) ≡
a m˜′i = m˜i + 1,0 m˜′i 6= m˜i + 1. (40)
Let U˜i(v, m˜) ≡ v · q˜i(m˜)− P˜i(m˜). We have:∑
mi∈Mi
(Ai)j(mi | 0)
∑
m′i∈Mi
[Ui(v, (m
′
i,m−i))− Ui(v, (mi,m−i))]αi(m′i | mi) (41)
=
∑
mi∈Mi
(Ai)j(mi | 0)
∑
m′i∈Mi
a · [Ui(v, (m′i,m−i))− Ui(v, (mi,m−i))]Ai(m′i | mi)
= a
∑
m′i∈Mi
[
Ui(v, (m
′
i,m−i)) (Ai)j+1(m′i | 0)− Ui(v, (m′i,m−i)) (Ai)j(m′i | 0)
]
= a [U˜i(v, (j + 1,m−i))− U˜i(v, (j,m−i))]= α˜i(j + 1 | j) [U˜i(v, (j + 1,m−i))− U˜i(v, (j,m−i))] j < k,≤  j = k,
where in the last line, k is chosen to be sufficiently large so that a ||(Ai)k+1( · | 0)− (Ai)k( · |
0)||v ·maxv,m |Ui(v,m)| ≤ , where || · ||v is the total variation norm, and limk→∞(Ai)k is well
defined because every mi is aperiodic (Stroock (2013), Section 4.1.7).
Consequently, the virtual revenue R˜ev(v, m˜) given by (P˜i, q˜i, α˜i)i∈I satisfies
R˜ev(v, m˜)
=
∑
m∈M
∏
i(Ai)m˜i(mi | 0) · Rev(v,m) ≥ minm∈M Rev(v,m) m˜i < k, ∀i ∈ I,
≥∑m∈M∏i(Ai)m˜i(mi | 0) · Rev(v,m)− I ·  ≥ minm∈M Rev(v,m)− I ·  otherwise.
(42)
Symmetric mechanism
Now fix a mechanism (qi, Pi)i∈I such that Mi = {0, 1, . . . , k}, for every i ∈ I, and suppose
Equation (17) holds for αi. We symmetrize the mechanism:
q˜1(m
′
1,m
′
−1) ≡
1
I!
∑
σ
qσ(1)(mσ(1) = m
′
1,mσ(2) = m
′
2, . . . ,mσ(I) = m
′
I), m
′ ∈M (43)
P˜1(m
′
1,m
′
−1) ≡
1
I!
∑
σ
Pσ(1)(mσ(1) = m
′
1,mσ(2) = m
′
2, . . . ,mσ(I) = m
′
I),
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where we sum over all permutations σ over {1, 2, . . . , I}. Likewise for the allocations and
payments of buyers 2, 3, . . . , I. Since αi is symmetric, the virtual revenue R˜ev(v,m) given by
(q˜i, P˜i, αi)i∈I is the average of Rev(v, (mσ(1),mσ(2), . . . ,mσ(I))) over all permutations σ and
given by (qi, Pi, αi)i∈I ; thus, we have R˜ev(v,m) ≥ minm Rev(v,m).
Implications for Numerical Solution
For a fixed value of a in Equation (17), maximizing the revenue guarantee over symmetric
mechanism (q, P ) is a linear programming problem (cf. Problem (11)). By varying the one-
dimensional variable a and solving the corresponding linear programming problems, we have
a tractable method to numerically solve for the optimal revenue guarantee.
5.2 Generalized Exponential Price Mechanism
Given Condition (17) on dual variables (which is without loss of generality by the previous
subsection), Condition (19) is a natural assumption on the virtual revenue. In this subsection
we fully characterize the implications of Condition (19) for the revenue guarantee; from
the characterization we arrive at a generalization of the exponential price mechanism. We
numerically demonstrate that the revenue guarantee of the exponential price mechanism is
quite good within this class of generalization. We also compare with the revenue guarantee
of the first price auction and with some upper bound on the revenue guarantee.
For simplicity, suppose I = 2. We consider a symmetric mechanism with k+ 1 messages:
M1 = M2 = {0, 1, . . . , k}. Our usual assumption on the mechanism is:
q(0, j) = 0 = P (0, j), q(j, l) ≥ 0, q(j, l) + q(l, j) ≤ 1, (j, l) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}2. (44)
Assume Condition (17). Condition (19) holds under I = 2 if and only if
2q(1, 0) = q(j + 1, l)− q(j, l) + q(l + 1, j)− q(l, j), (j, l) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}2,
q(1, k) = q(j + 1, k)− q(j, k), j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, (45)
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and
−2aP (1, 0) = P (j, l) + P (l, j)− a(P (j + 1, l)− P (j, l))− a(P (l + 1, j)− P (l, j)),
(j, l) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}2,
P (k, 0)− aP (1, k) = P (j, k) + P (k, j)− a(P (j + 1, k)− P (j, k)), j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}.
(46)
It is without loss to assume that the feasibility constraint q(j, k) + q(k, j) ≤ 1 binds for
every j (if not, we can increase q(k, j), which strictly increases Rev(v, (k − 1, j)), without
decreasing any other Rev(v,m) or violating any feasibility constraint):
q(j, k) + q(k, j) = 1, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}. (47)
Lemma 2. For any allocation q that satisfies Conditions (45) and (47), we have q(1, 0) =
(3k + 1)/(4k2) and q(1, k) = 1/(2k).
Lemma 3. For any payment P that satisfies Condition (46), we have:
P (k, k) =
(
(1 + 1/a)k − 1)2 aP (1, 0) + ((1 + 1/a)k − 1) (aP (1, k)− P (k, 0)). (48)
Define,
Y0 ≡ 2aP (1, 0), Y1 ≡ −P (k, 0) + aP (1, k), (49)
i.e., −Y0 is equal to the first line of (46), and −Y1 is equal to the second line of (46).
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 lead us unambiguously to the following problem:
Π#2 ≡ sup
k≥1, a≥0, Y0, Y1
∑
v
min
(
3k + 1
2k2
av − Y0, av
2k
− Y1, Y0
(
(1 + 1/a)k − 1)2 + 2Y1 ((1 + 1/a)k − 1)) p(v).
(50)
Comparing Π#2 above with Π
∗
2 in Equation (23), the main difference is that in Π
#
2 there
are two variables Y0 and Y1, instead of a single variable X in Π
∗
2; the difference between the
coefficient of 3k+1
2k2
in Π#2 and of
3
2k
in Π∗2 is unimportant, since k →∞ in both maximization
problems. In fact, if k →∞, Π∗2 is a special case of Π#2 with Y0 = 2X and Y1 = X −X((1 +
1/a)k − 1). Thus, we have Π#2 ≥ Π∗2 as k →∞.
Proposition 2. Suppose there are two buyers. There exists a symmetric mechanism that
guarantees a revenue of Π#2 defined in (50).
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We now specify the mechanism for Proposition 2. Consider the following allocation rule:
q(0, l) = 0, l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, (51)
q(j + 1, l)− q(j, l) =

(2k + 1)/(4k2) j < l
(3k + 1)/(4k2) j = l
(4k + 1)/(4k2) j > l
, (j, l) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}2, (52)
q(j + 1, k)− q(j, k) = 1/(2k), j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}.
It is easy to check that the above allocation rule satisfies the feasibility constraint, and
Conditions (45) and (47). As k → ∞, the above allocation rule becomes identical to the
allocation rule of exponential price mechanism in Equation (6).
Given any values of Y0 and Y1, we can choose the following solution to Equation (46):
P (j, l)− a(P (j + 1, l)− P (j, l)) =
−Y0/2 0 ≤ l < k,−Y1 − P (k, j) l = k, , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1},
(53)
which is equivalent to (see footnote 7):
P (j, l) =
((1 + 1/a)j − 1) Y02 0 ≤ l < k((1 + 1/a)j − 1) (Y1 + ((1 + 1/a)k − 1) Y02 ) l = k , (j, l) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}2.
(54)
The above payment rule is identical to the payment rule of exponential price mechanism in
Equation (7), except when the other player submits the boundary message k.
Figure 2 shows the revenue guarantees Π∗2 and Π
#
2 for various prior distributions
10 as
ν → 0 and compares them with the first price auction with two buyers, where the reserve
price is chosen to maximize the revenue guarantee in the first price auction (Bergemann,
Brooks, and Morris, 2016). We see that Π∗2 and Π
#
2 are generally very close, though Π
#
2
is slightly better than Π∗2 when the distribution is heavily concentrated among high values.
In these examples Π#2 is always better than the optimal revenue guarantee from first price
auction with reserve price. In Figure 2 we also include the optimal revenue guarantees from
10Distribution Beta(b, c) has a p.d.f. of vb−1(1 − v)c−1 · Γ(b+c)Γ(b)Γ(c) for v ∈ [0, 1]. Beta(1, 1) is of course the
uniform distribution.
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the exponential price mechanism in Theorem 1 with one buyer.
Figure 2: Revenue guarantees from Proposition 1 (Π∗2), Proposition 2 (Π
#
2 ), first price
auction with optimal reserve price (Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris, 2016), and Theorem 1
(Π∗1).
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probability density function
Uniform
CDF 2 v - v2
CDF v2
Beta(2, 2)
Beta(2, 4)
Beta(4, 2)
Beta(8, 1)
Prior distribution Mean Π#2 Π
∗
2 FPA w/ optimal reserve Π
∗
1
Uniform 0.5 0.273 0.272 0.177 0.204
CDF 2v − v2 0.3333 0.166 0.166 0.102 0.120
CDF v2 0.6667 0.437 0.431 0.346 0.341
Beta(2, 2) 0.5 0.302 0.301 0.230 0.229
Beta(2, 4) 0.3333 0.188 0.188 0.139 0.140
Beta(4, 2) 0.6667 0.475 0.463 0.414 0.381
Beta(8, 1) 0.8889 0.751 0.710 0.716 0.652
Finally, consider the following “wallet game” information structure: buyer i privately
observes signal si, i = 1, 2, where si has the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The common
value is v = (s1 + s2)/2. Thus, the prior of the common value is the “triangle” distribution.
Given this information structure, the optimal mechanism is a direct mechanism that assigns
the good to buyer 1 if s1 ≥ s2 and s1 + s2/2 ≥ 1/2; assigns to buyer 2 if s2 > s1 and
s2 + s1/2 ≥ 1/2; and does not assign the good otherwise. (The virtual value of buyer i
is si − 1/2 + sj/2, j 6= i.) The payment rule is given by Myerson’s Lemma and makes
this mechanism incentive compatible. The expected revenue of this optimal mechanism is
0.3611.11 Thus, if the prior of the common value is the triangle distribution, 0.3611 is an (not
11We compute: 2 · ∫ 1
s1=0
∫ s1
s2=0
max(s1 + s2/2− 1/2, 0) ds2 ds1 = 13/36 ≈ 0.3611.
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necessarily tight) upper bound on the revenue guarantee of any mechanism. We compute
for the triangle distribution: Π∗2 = 0.31094 and Π
#
2 = 0.31324, which are 86% of this upper
bound.
6 Conclusion
We propose a new class of mechanisms (the exponential price mechanisms) to sell a common
value good. The mechanisms are simple and practical, and can guarantee a good revenue
over all information structures and equilibria. The revenue guarantee is provably optimal
when there is one buyer, and converges to the full surplus as the number of buyers tends to
infinity. To derive these mechanisms we introduce a linear programming duality approach,
which we believe is useful for other robust mechanism design problems, e.g., for studying the
revenue guarantee when buyers have both common and private values.
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Appendix
A Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Lemma 2. By (47) we have q(k, k) = 1/2. By the second line of (45) this implies
that q(j, k) = j/(2k) and q(k, j) = 1− j/(2k), j = 0, 1, . . . , k. Then we have
k − (k − 1)k
4k
=
k−1∑
j=0
q(k, j) =
k−1∑
j=0
k−1∑
l=0
q(l + 1, j)− q(l, j) = k2q(1, 0) (55)
where the last equality follows from the first line of (45). Thus, q(1, 0) = (3k + 1)/(4k2).
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix an arbitrary P that satisfies Condition (46).
From the second line of (46) (Rev(v, (j − 1, k)) = Rev(v, (j, k))), we have
P (j + 1, k)− P (j, k) = (1 + 1/a)(P (j, k)− P (j − 1, k)) + (P (k, j)− P (k, j − 1))/a, (56)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Equation (56) implies that
P (j + 1, k)−P (j, k) = (1 + 1/a)jP (1, k) +
j∑
j′=1
(1 + 1/a)j−j
′
(P (k, j′)−P (k, j′− 1))/a, (57)
and as a consequence, for any j = 0, 1, . . . , k:
P (j, k) = a((1 + 1/a)j − 1)P (1, k) +
j−1∑
j′=1
((1 + 1/a)j−j
′ − 1)(P (k, j′)− P (k, j′ − 1)). (58)
We claim that
X(l) ≡
l−1∑
j=1
(1 + 1/a)l−j(P (l, j)− P (l, j − 1))
= P (l, l − 1) + a((1 + 1/a)l − 1)2P (1, 0)− (1 + 1/a)lP (l, 0), (59)
for every l = 1, 2, . . . , k. Equation (59) for l = k and Equation (58) together imply Equation
(48), which proves the lemma.
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Clearly, (59) is true for l = 1. Suppose (59) is true for l = κ < k as an induction
hypothesis; we prove that this implies (59) is true for l = κ+ 1.
From Rev(v, (κ, j − 1)) = Rev(v, (κ, j)) we have:
P (κ+ 1, j)− P (κ+ 1, j − 1) (60)
= (1 + 1/a)(P (κ, j)− P (κ, j − 1)) + (1 + 1/a)(P (j, κ)− P (j − 1, κ))
− (P (j + 1, κ)− P (j, κ)),
summing the above equation across j = 1, 2, . . . , κ− 1 gives:
κ−1∑
j=1
(1 + 1/a)κ+1−j(P (κ+ 1, j)− P (κ+ 1, j − 1)) (61)
=
κ−1∑
j=1
(1 + 1/a)κ+2−j(P (κ, j)− P (κ, j − 1)) +
κ−1∑
j=1
(1 + 1/a)κ+2−j(P (j, κ)− P (j − 1, κ))
−
κ−1∑
j=1
(1 + 1/a)κ+1−j(P (j + 1, κ)− P (j, κ))
=
κ−1∑
j=1
(1 + 1/a)κ+2−j(P (κ, j)− P (κ, j − 1)) + (1 + 1/a)κ+1P (1, κ)− (1 + 1/a)2(P (κ, κ)− P (κ− 1, κ)).
That is,
X(κ+ 1) (62)
=
κ−1∑
j=1
(1 + 1/a)κ+2−j(P (κ, j)− P (κ, j − 1)) + (1 + 1/a)κ+1P (1, κ)
− (1 + 1/a)2(P (κ, κ)− P (κ− 1, κ)) + (1 + 1/a)(P (κ+ 1, κ)− P (κ+ 1, κ− 1))
= (1 + 1/a)2[P (κ, κ− 1) + a((1 + 1/a)κ − 1)2P (1, 0)− (1 + 1/a)κP (κ, 0)] + (1 + 1/a)κ+1P (1, κ)
− (1 + 1/a)2(P (κ, κ)− P (κ− 1, κ)) + (1 + 1/a)(P (κ+ 1, κ)− P (κ+ 1, κ− 1)),
where in the last equality we have used the induction hypothesis (59) for l = κ.
From Rev(v, (κ, 0)) = Rev(v, (1, 0)) we have (1 + 1/a)P (κ, 0) − P (1, κ) = P (κ + 1, 0) −
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2P (1, 0). Therefore, the previous equation is equivalent to:
X(κ+ 1) (63)
= (1 + 1/a)2P (κ, κ− 1) + a(1 + 1/a)2((1 + 1/a)κ − 1)2P (1, 0)− (1 + 1/a)κ+1(P (κ+ 1, 0)− 2P (1, 0))
− (1 + 1/a)2(P (κ, κ)− P (κ− 1, κ)) + (1 + 1/a)(P (κ+ 1, κ)− P (κ+ 1, κ− 1))
= (1 + 1/a)2P (κ, κ− 1) + [a(1 + 1/a)2((1 + 1/a)κ − 1)2 + 2(1 + 1/a)κ+1]P (1, 0)− (1 + 1/a)κ+1P (κ+ 1, 0)
− (1 + 1/a)2(P (κ, κ)− P (κ− 1, κ)) + (1 + 1/a)(P (κ+ 1, κ)− P (κ+ 1, κ− 1))
From Rev(v, (κ, κ)) = Rev(v, (1, 0)) we have (1 + 1/a)P (κ, κ)− P (κ+ 1, κ) = −P (1, 0).
Therefore, the previous equation is equivalent to:
X(κ+ 1) (64)
= (1 + 1/a)2P (κ, κ− 1) + [a(1 + 1/a)2((1 + 1/a)κ − 1)2 + 2(1 + 1/a)κ+1 + (1 + 1/a)]P (1, 0)
− (1 + 1/a)κ+1P (κ+ 1, 0) + (1 + 1/a)2P (κ− 1, κ)− (1 + 1/a)P (κ+ 1, κ− 1).
From Rev(v, (κ−1, κ)) = Rev(v, (1, 0)) we have (1+1/a)P (κ, κ−1)+(1+1/a)P (κ−1, κ)−
P (κ+ 1, κ− 1) = P (κ, κ)− 2P (1, 0), Therefore, the previous equation is equivalent to:
X(κ+ 1) (65)
= [a(1 + 1/a)2((1 + 1/a)κ − 1)2 + 2(1 + 1/a)κ+1 − (1 + 1/a)]P (1, 0)
− (1 + 1/a)κ+1P (κ+ 1, 0) + (1 + 1/a)P (κ, κ).
Finally, using (1 + 1/a)P (κ, κ)− P (κ+ 1, κ) = −P (1, 0) again we get:
X(κ+ 1) (66)
= [a(1 + 1/a)2((1 + 1/a)κ − 1)2 + 2(1 + 1/a)κ+1 − (1 + 1/a)− 1]P (1, 0)
− (1 + 1/a)κ+1P (κ+ 1, 0) + P (κ+ 1, κ).
Since a(1 + 1/a)2((1 + 1/a)κ− 1)2 + 2(1 + 1/a)κ+1− (1 + 1/a)− 1 = a((1 + 1/a)κ+1− 1)2,
this proves (59) when l = κ+ 1.
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